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LOUIS BERNKRANT et aI., Appellants, v. DOROTHY 
BLACK FOWLER, as Executrix, etc., Respondent. 
[1] Decedents' Estates--ActioDS Against Representatives-Actions 
Founded on Contracts-Parties.-An action against an execu-
trix to have a promissory note secured by a trust deed can-
celled and the property reconveYI'd to plaintiffs and to recover 
amounts paid under protest to the executrix after decedent's 
death, based on decedent's oral promise to provide by will for 
forgiveness of any unpaid balance of the note at the time of 
his death in return for plaintiffs' refinancing their obligations 
so as to pay a substantial part of their indebtedness to him, 
and involving an adverse claim to an interest in real property, 
was properly brought against the executrix pursuant to Prob. 
Code, § 573, and, since plaintiffs did not seek to enforce a 
trnst against any of the beneficiaries of the estate, none of the 
beneficiaries was an indispensable party. In view of the fact 
that plaintiffs, apart from seeking recovery of sums paid di-
rectly to the executrix to protect their interests pending the 
action, sought only a determination that pursuant to their 
contract With decedent their liability on the note had been 
discharged, the executrix represented all those interested in 
the estate just as she would have had she brought an action 
to enforce the note and been met with the defense that it had 
been discharged. 
[2] Id.-Claims-Presentation: Actions-Testimony of Parties-
Testimony Inhibited.-Whereplaintjffs suing an executrix did 
not seek a money judgment payable out of assets of decedent's 
estate but only a determination that their obligations had been 
discharged, they were not required to file a claim Ilgllinst the 
estate (Prob. Code, § 707) and were not precluded by Code 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Executol's Ilnd Administrators, § 1061. 
McR:. Dig. Refel'ences: [lJ Dccctll'nt:;' Estates, § 811; (2] Dece-
dents' Estates, §§ 459, 573; l3, 4, 6] WiIIR, § 157; {5] Contlict of 
Laws, §23. 
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Civ. Proc., § 1880, sllhd. ::I, from testifying to events occurring 
before decedent's denth. (Disnpproving Norgard v. E8tate of 
Norgard, 54 CaJ.App.2d 82, ]28 P.2d 566, to extent it indicates 
that ('oue Civ. Pro!' .. * ISSO, ~uhd. 3. is nppli!':lhle in adion 
such as this.) 
[3] Wills-Agreements as to Wills-Oral Agreements-Statute of 
Frauds.-California's intel'c,;t in protecting estntes being pro-
bated here from false claillls based on alleged oral contracts 
to make wills would be constitutionally suffieient to justify the 
Legislature's making our stntute of frauds applicable to all 
such contracts sought to be enforced against such estates. 
[4] Id.-Agreements as to Wills-Oral Agreements-Statute of 
Frauds.-In an action against an executrix to have a promis-
sory note ;<ecured by a tru;.:t deed cancclled und the property 
reconveyed to plaintiffs and to recover amounts puid under 
protest to the executrix after decedent's death, based on 
decedent's oral promise to provide by will for forgiveness of 
any unpaid balance at the time of his death in return for 
plaintiffs' refinancing their obligations so as to pay a substan-
tial part of their indebtedness to him, where plaintiffs were 
residents of Nevada, the contract was made in that state and 
plaintiffs performed it there, the California statute of frnuds, 
in the absence of plain legislative direction to the contrary, 
could not reasonably be interpreted as applying to the contract 
though decedent subsequently moved to California and died 
here. The basic policy of upholding the expectations of the 
parties by enforcing contracts valid under the only law appar-
ently applicable would preclude an interpretation of the Cali-
fornia statute of frauds that would make it apply to and thus 
invalidate the contract because decedent moved to this state 
and died here. 
[6] Conllict of Laws-Procedure-Statute of Frauds.-Just as par-
ties to local transactions cannot be expected to take cognizance 
of the law of other jurisdictions, they cannot be expected to 
anticipate a change in the local statute of frauds. Protection 
of rights growing out of valid contracts precludes interpreting 
the general language of the statute of frauds to destroy such 
rights whether the possible applicability of the statute arises 
from the movement of one or more parties across state lines 
or subsequent enactment of the statute. 
[6] Wills---Agreements as to Wills---Oral Agreements---Statute of 
Frauds.-In an action against an executrix to have a promis-
sory note secured by a trust deed cancelled and the property 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Wills, § 513 et seq.; Am.Jur., Statute of 
Frauds, § 561, Wills, § 167. 
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Conflict of Laws, § 95; Am.Jur., Conflict of 
Laws, § 198 et seq. 
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reconveyed to plaintiffs and to recover amounts paid under 
protest to the executrix after decedent's death,based on 
decedent's oral, promise to provide by will for fOl'gin:oness of 
any unpaid balance At the time of his death in return for 
plaintiffs' refin:lllcing their obligations so as to pay a substan-
tial part of their indebtedness to him, in which there was no 
finding as to where decedent was domiciled at the time the 
contract was ma(h-, e\'en if he was dOl!lifi\£'tl in California at 
the time the contrnct was lIu1I1!' the result should be the same 
as if he were domiciled in Nevn<la, where the contract was 
made there and performed by plaintiffs'ther£', and it involved 
the refinancing of obligations arising from the sale of Nevada 
land and secured by interests therein. Nevada had a sub-
stantial interest in the contract and in protecting the rights 
of its residents who wcre parties thereto, and it!! policy was 
that the contract was valid and enforccable. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. James G. Whyte, Judge. Reversed. 
Action against an executrix to have an installment note 
secured by a trust deed cancelled and the property reconveyed 
to plaintiffs, aud to recover amounts paid under ·protest to the 
executrix after decedent's death. Judgment for defendant 
reversed. 
Betty Aronow and George Rudiak for Appellants. 
Egley & Wiener and Paul Egley for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs appeal on the clerk's transcript 
from a judgment for defendant as executrix of the estate of 
John Granrud. They contend that the findings of fact do 
not support the jUdgment. 
Some time before 1954 plaintiffs purchased the Granrud 
Garden Apartments in Las Vegas, Nevada. In 1954 the 
property was encumbered by a first deed of trust given to 
secure an installment note payable to third parties and a 
second deed of trust given to secure an installment note pay-
able to Granrud at $200 per mouth plus interest. Granrnd's 
note and deed of trust provided for subordination to a deed 
of trust plaintiffs might execute to secure a construction loan. 
In July 1954, there remained unpaid approximately $11,000 
on the note secured by the first deed of trust and approxi-
mately $24,000 on the note payable to Granrud. At that time 
Granrud wished to buy a trailer park and asked plaintiffs 
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to refinance their obligations and pay a l'ubstantial part of 
their indebtedness to him. At a meeting in Las Vegas he 
stated that if plaintiffs would do so, he would provide by will 
that any debt that remained on the purcha~e price at the time 
of his death would be cancelled and forgiYcn. Plaintiff's then 
arranged for a new loan of $25,000, the most they could 
obtain 011 the property, secured by a llew first Med of trust. 
They used the proceeds to pay the balance of the loan ~ecured 
by the existing first deed of trust and $13,114.20 of their 
indebtedness to Granrud.They executed a new note for the 
balance of $9,227 owing Granrud, payable in installments of 
$175 per month secured by a new second deed of trust. Thi~ 
deed of trust contained no subordination provision. The 
$13,114.20 was deposited in Granrud's bank account in Co-
vina, California and subsequently used by him to buy a trailer 
park. Plaintiffs incurred expenses of $800.90 in refinancing 
their obligations. 
Granrud died testate on March 4, 1956, a resident of Los 
Angeles County. His will, dated January 23, 1956, was ad-
mitted to probate, and defendant was appointed executrix of 
his estate. His will made no provision for cancelling the bal-
ance of $6,425 due on the note. at the time of his death. Plain-
tiffs have continued to make regular payments of principal 
and interest to defendant under protest. 
Plaintiffs brought this action to have the note cancelled 
and discharged and the property reconveyed to them and to 
recover the amounts paid defendant after Granrud's death. 
The trial court concluded that the action was barred by both 
the Nevada and the California statute of frauds; that to re-
move the bar of the statutes, the action must be one for 
quasi-specific performance in which an heir or beneficiary 
under the will would be an indispensable party; and that de-
fendant was not estopped to rely on the statutes of frauds. 
[1] Probate Code, section 573, provides that "Actions 
for the recovery of any property, real or personal, or for the 
possession thereof, or to quiet title thereto, or to enforce a 
lien thereon, or to determine any adverse claim thereon, and 
all actions founded upon contracts . . . may be maintained 
by and against executors and administrators in all cases in 
which the cause of action whether arising" before or after 
death is one \vhich would not abate upon the death of their re-
spective testators or intestates .... " Since the present action 
is founded on contract and involves an adverse claim to an 
interest in real property, it was properly brought against 
) 
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the executrix pursuant to this section. Moreov('r, ;;ill('(> plaill' 
tiffs do not scek to enforcc a trnst against any of thc hell('-
ficiarics of thc estate, 11011(' of the beneficiaries is all indis· 
pensable party. (Cf. Balik of Ca7ilornia v. Superior Court, 
16 Ca1.2d 516, 524 [106 P.2d 879].) Apart from seeking the 
recovery of snms paid tlirectl~' to deff>udant to protcei thcir 
interests pending the action, plaintiffs seek only a detl!r-
mination that pursuant to their contract with Granrml their 
liability on the note has been discharged ann the s('curity 
interest in the property thereby r(,'leased, Under these cir-
cumstances defendant represents all those interested in the 
estate just as she would had she brought an action to enforC'e 
the note and been met with the defens(' that it had been dis-
charged. (McCaugh(!f Y. LYf!ll, 152 Cal. 615, 616-618 f!)3 
P. 681] ; Patchett v, Webber, 198 Cal. 440, 448 [24[) P. 422] ; 
Estate of Kessler, 32 Cal.2d 367, 369 [196 P.2d 5;')9] ; Schroeder 
v. Wilson, 89 Cal.App.2d 6:3. 68-69 [200 P.2d In]; Bank 
of America v. O'Shields, 128 Cal.App.2d 212, 217 [275 P.2d 
153] ; Ca.digan v. American Trust Co., 131 Cal.App.2d 780, 
781 [281 P.2d 332] ; Beyl Y. Robinson, 179 Cal.App.2d 444, 
456 [4 Ca1.Rptr. 18].) 
[2] Moreover, sinee plaintiffs do not seek a money judg-
ment payable out of the assets of the estate but only a de-
termination that their obligations have been discharged, they 
were not required to file a claim against the estate (see Prob. 
Code, § 707) and were not precluded by suhdivision 3 of 
section 1880 of the Code of Civil Proredure 1 from testifying 
to events occurring before Granrud's {leath. (Porter v. Van 
Denbu.rah, 15 Cal.2d 173, 176-177 [99 P.2d 265]; Sal'i'nrl'~ 
Union Bank etc. Co. v. CI'Oldcy, 176 Cal. 543, 547 [169 P. 
67]; Calmon v. Sarraille. 142 Cal. 638, 642 [76 P. 486J; 
Alvarez Y. Rt:tter, 67 Cal.App.2d 574, 579-580 r155 P.2d 831 ; 
Streeter v. Martinelli, 65 Cal.App.2d 65, 71-73 [149 P.2d 
725] ; Beyl v. Robin.son, 179 Cal.App.2d 444, 455-456 [4 Cal. 
Rptr. 18] ; Sperry v. Tammany, 106 Cal.App.2d 694, 698 [23;') 
P.2d 8471 ; Jliller &- Lux, Inc. v. Katz, 10 Cal.App. 576, 578 
[102 P. 946] ; see People v. Olvera, 43 Cal. 492, 494.) To 
the extent that it indicates that suhdivision 3 of section 18Bn 
'Section 1880 provides: "The following per80ns cannot be witnesses: 
"3. Parties or assignors of parties to an artion or proceeding, or 
persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted, against 
an executor or administrator upon a claim, or (kmand against the estate 
of a dec~ased person, as to any matter or fact occurring before the death 
ot such tleeeased person. " 
) 
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is applicable in an action sllch as this OI1t', Norgard v. Estate 
of Norgard, 54 Cal.App.2d 82 [128 P.2d 566], is inconsistent 
with the fort'going authoritit's and is disapproved. 
Subdivision 6 of section 1624 of the Civil Code provides 
that" An agre<.>ment which by its terms is not to be performed 
during the lifetime of the promisor, or an agreemcnt to devise 
or bt'queath any property, or to make any provision for any 
person by will" is "invalid, unless the samt', or some note 
or memorandum thereof, is in writing and subs('ribt'd by the 
party to be ('harged or by his agcnt." (See also Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1973, subd. 6.) Plaintiffs concede that in th.e absence 
of an estoppel, the contract in this case would be invalid 
under this provillion if it is subject thercto. They contend, 
llowever, that only the Nevada statute of frauds is applicablc 
and point out that the Nevada statute has 110 counterpart 
to subdivision 6. Defendant contends that the California 
statute of frauds is applicablt', and that if it is not, the Neyada 
statute of frauds covering real property transactions invali-
dates the cOlltract.2 
We have found no Nevada case in point. We believe, how-
('vel', that Nevada would follow the general rule in other juris-
dictions, that an oral agreement providing for the discharge 
of an obligation to pay money secured by an interest in rt'al 
property is not within the real property provision of the 
statute of frauds, on tile ground that the termination of the 
sceurity interest is merely incidental to and follows by opera-
tion of law from the discharge of the principal obligation. 
(Sell weider v. Lang, 29 Minn. 254 [13 N.W. 33, 34, 43 Am. 
Rep. 202] ; Givens v. Featherstone, (Tex.Ciy~App.) 12 S.W.2<l 
613. 614]; Riley y. A.tllrTfon. 185 Ark. 425 [47 S.W.2d 
568]; Brown v. Ruffin, 189 N.C. 262 [126 S.E. 613, 616]; 
P'irst Nat. Balik v. Gallo(lhrr. 119 Millll. 46:3 [138 N.W. 681, 
682, Ann.Cas. 1914B 120] ; Runyan v. IIfrr.~e,.call, 11 Johns. 
"Nevada Revised Statutes, section 111.!!0.', suh<1h'j"ion 1, Pl'o\'i<1cs: 
"No estate or interest in lands, other than for lI~asP9 for n term not 
.~xeeelling one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning lands, or 
in any m:\llI1er relating thereto, shall bc ('reated, grantell, a~~igned, 
~urren<1ered or declared after December 2, lS61, unless by act or opera· 
tion of law, or by deed or conveyun"e, in writing, subscribed by the party 
('reating, granting, assigning, surr('ndering, or cle..J:lI'illg the sallie, or by 
his lawful ngent th('1'('unto allthorize.t in writinJr." 
Seetion 111.210, 9uhdh'i8ion I, provides: "Evt'ry contract for the 
leasing for n longer period than one yenr, or for the snle of nny lands, 
or IIny interest 11\ lanc1s, shall he void unless the ('ontract, or some note 
or memorlllulllm tlw1'l'of, exprl.'s~illg the (',,"sidt'rntioll. ) ... in wl'iting. and 
be subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to be made." 
BERNKRANT l!. FOWLER [55 C.2d 
(N.Y.) 534, 538; Aclola ". Ackla, 6 Pa. 228, 230; McKenzie 
". Stewart, 196 Ala. 241 [72 So. 109, 110] ; Mutual Mill Ins. 
Co. v. Gordo~, 12 Ill. 366 (12 N.R 747, 750]; Benavides 
v. White, 94 CaLApp.2(1 849, 850 [211 P.2d 597]; see also 
Wright v. Donaubauer, 137 Tex. 473 [154 S.W.2<l 637, 639] ; 
Rigney v. Lovejoy, 13 N.H. ~-17, 253; D01lgherty v. Randan, 
3 Mich. 581. 58G; Ply!'/' Y. Sulliran. 284 App.Div. 697 [134 
N.Y.S.2d 521, 523J; 2 Corhin 011 Contracts, pp. 394-397; 
contra, Parker v. Barker, 43 Mass. (2 Mete.) 423, 431-432; 
Duff v. United Statcs Tnlsf Co., 327 Mass. 17 [97 N.E.2d 189, 
191] ; Brooks v. Benham, 70 Conn. 92 [38 A. 908, 910, 39 A. 
1112, 66 Am.St.Rep. 87] j Phillips v. Leavitt, 54 Me. 405, 407.) 
We are therefore confronted with a contract that is valid 
under the law of Nevada but invalid under the California 
statute of frauds if that statute is applicable. [3] We have 
no doubt that California's interest in protecting estates being 
probated here from false claims based on alleged oral con-
tracts to make wills is <'>ollstitutionally sufficient to justify 
the Legislature's making our statute of frauds applicable to 
all such contracts sought to be enforced against such estates. 
(See Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 298 [113 
N.E.2d 424] j Emery v. Burballk, 163 Mass. 326-329 [39 N.E. 
1026, 47 Am.St.R<.>p. 456, 28 L.R.A. 57J.) The Legislature, 
however, is ordinarily concerned with enacting laws to govern 
purely local transactions, and it has not spelled out the ex-
tent to which the statute of frauds is to apply to a contract 
having substantial contacts with another state. Accordingly, 
we must determine its scope in the light of applicable prin-
eiples of the law of conflict of laws. (See People v. One 1953 
Ford Victoria, 48 Ca1.2d 595, 598-599 [311 P.2d 480J j 2 
Corbin on Contracts, p. 67; Currie, Married Women's Con-
tracts, 25 U. Chi. h Rev. 227, 230-231; Cheatham and Reese, 
Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 Columbo L. Rev. 959, 961.) 
[4] In the present case plaintiffs were residents of Ne-
vada, the contract was made in Nevada, and plaintiffs per-
formed it there. If Granrud was a resident of Nevada at the 
time the contract was made, the California statute of frauds, 
in the absence of a plain legislative direction to the contrary, 
('ould not reasonably be interprct<.>d as applying to the con-
tract even though Gt'anrud subsequently moved to California 
and died here. (See MeCn7,(' \'. Baqby, 186 F.2d 546, 550.) 
The basic policy of uphold illl-r thp expectations of the parties 
by enforcing contracts valid U1Hler the only law apparently 
applicable would preclude an interpretation of our statute 
-) 
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of fl'lntds that would make it apply to and thus invalidate 
the contra(~t bccllul';e GI'anrnc1 movl'd to California and died 
here. Sueh a cal'le would he analogous to People v. One 1953 
Ford Victoria, 48 CIl1.2d 595 [311 P.2d 480], where we held 
that a T('xas lllol·tgngee of all automobile mortgaged in Texas 
did not forfl'it his interest when the automobile was subse-
quently used to tl'ansport narcotics in California although 
he had failed to make the character investigation of the 
mortgagor required by California law. A mortgagee entering 
into a purely local transaction in another state could not 
reasonably be expected to take eognizance of the law of all 
other jurisdictions where the property might possibly be 
taken,and accordingly, the California statute requiring an 
investigation to protect his interest could not reasonably be 
interpreted to apply to such out.of-state mortgagc('s. Another 
analogy is found ill the holding that the statute of frauds 
did not apply to contl'actl'! to make wills entered into before 
the statute was enacted (Rogcrs v. Schlotterback, 167 Cal. 
35, 45 [138 P. 728 J). [ 5 ] Just as parties to local transac-
tions cannot be expected to take cognizance of the law of 
other jurisdictions, they canllot be expected to anticipate a 
change in the local statute of frauds. Protection. of rights 
growing out of valid contracts precludes interpreting the 
general language of the statute of frauds to destroy such 
rights whether the possible applicability of the statute arises 
from the movement of one or more of the parties across state 
lines or subsequent enactment of the statute. (See Currie and 
Schreter, UncO'1l.ditutional Discrimination in tke Oonflict of 
Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 Yale L.J. 1323, 1334.) 
[ 6 ] In the present case, however, there is no finding as 
to where Granrud was domiciled at the time the contract was 
made. Since he had a bank account in California at that time 
and died a resident here less than two years later it may be 
that he was domiciled here when the l'ontract was made. 
Even if he was, the result should be the same. The contract 
wa'> made in Nevada and performed by plaintiffs there, and 
it involved the refinancing of obligations arising from the 
sale of Nevada land and secured by iuterests therein. Nevada 
has a substantial interest in the contract and in protecting 
the rights of its residents who are parties thereto, and its 
policy is that the contract is valid and enforcible. California's 
policy is also to enforce lawful contracts. That policY,how-
ever, must be subordinated in the case of any contract that 
does not meet the requirements of an applicable statute of 
) 
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frauds. III determillill~ whether the contract herein is subjeet 
to the California statute of frauds, we must consider both the 
policy. to protect the reasonable expectations of the parties 
and the policy of the statute of frauds. (See Cheatham and 
Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 Columbo L. Rev. 959, 
978-980.) It is true that if Granrud was domiciled here at 
the time the contract was made, plaintiffs may have been 
alerted to the possibility that the California statute of frauds 
might apply. Since California, however, would have no in-
terest in applying its own statute of frauds unless Granrud 
remained here until his death, plaintiffs were not bound to 
know that California's statute might ultimately be invoked 
against them. Unless they could rely on their own law, they 
would have to look to the laws of all of the jurisdictions to 
which Granrud might move regardless of where he was domi-
ciled when the contract was made. We conclude, therefore, 
that the contract herein does not fall within our statute of 
frauds. (See 2 Corbin on Contracts, p. 76; Lorenzen, The 
Statute of Fmuds and tile Conflict of Laws, 32 Yale hJ. 311, 
338; EhrcJ1zwei~, The Statute of Frauds in the Conflict of 
Laws, 59 Columbo L. Rev. 874; Currie and Schreter, Uncon-
stitutional Discrimination in the Conflict o.f Laws: Equal Pro-
tection, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 51.) Since there is thus no conflict 
between the law of Californiaalld the law of Nevada, we 
can give effect to the common policy of both states to enforce 
lawful contracts and sustain Nevada's interest in protecting 
its residents and their reasonable expectations growing out 
of a transaction substantially relatpd to that state without 
subordinating any legitimate interest of this state . 
. The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J., 
and Dooling, J., coneurred. 
